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The social psychology of 
protest
Jacquelien van Stekelenburg and Bert 
Klandermans
VU University Amsterdam, The Netherlands
Abstract
Social psychological research has taught us a lot about why people protest. This 
article provides a theoretical and empirical overview. Discussed are grievances, efficacy, 
identification, emotions and social embeddedness, followed by the most recent approaches, 
which combine these concepts into dual pathway models. Finally, two future directions 
are discussed: (1) to shed light on the paradox of persistent participation, and (2) to 
clarify how perceptions of sociopolitical context affects protest participation.
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Why do people protest? This question has always intrigued social scientists. Why are 
people prepared to sacrifice wealth, a pleasant and carefree life, or sometimes even their 
lives for a common cause? This question brings us to the level of analysis of the indi-
vidual and therefore to the realm of social psychology. People – social psychologists 
never tire of asserting – live in a perceived world. They respond to the world as they 
perceive and interpret it. Indeed, this is what a social psychology of protest is about – 
trying to understand why people who are seemingly in the same situation respond so 
differently. As social psychology explores the causes of the thoughts, feelings and actions 
of people – and primarily how these are influenced by social contexts – it has a lot to 
offer to the study of protest participation. We illustrate this point with an overview of 
state-of-the-art theoretical approaches and a review of empirical evidence.
The question as to why people engage in protest has occupied social psychologists 
for at least three decades, and it has received diverging answers over the years (see 
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Klandermans et al., 2008 for empirical evidence combining these explanations; Van 
Stekelenburg and Klandermans, 2007; 2010 for a theoretical overview; and Van Zomeren 
et al., 2008 for a meta-analytical overview). We will describe the main theoretical 
approaches and empirical evidence will be discussed. We close with a concluding sec-
tion. In this section we will try to assess where we stand and propose future directions 
that theorizing and research might take.
Before we proceed to the social psychological answer as to why people protest, we 
devote a few words to protest behaviour itself. There is a vast array of specific protest 
behaviours that people might exhibit as a reaction to strongly felt grievances. Wright et 
al. (1990) have proposed a framework based on three distinctions: the first between inac-
tion and action, the second between actions directed at improving one’s personal condi-
tions (individual action) and actions directed at improving the conditions of one’s group 
(collective action). The third distinction is between actions that conform to the norms of 
the existing social system (normative action like petitioning and taking part in a demon-
stration) and those that violate existing social rules (non-normative action like illegal 
protests and civil disobedience). This distinction is important because one may expect 
that the motivational dynamics underlying the different protests are different. Indeed, the 
fact that someone is prepared to take part in street demonstrations does not automatically 
mean that he or she is inclined to use violence to reach their group’s goals?
Why people protest
Classical theories proposed that people participate in protest to express their grievances 
stemming from relative deprivation, frustration, or perceived injustice (Berkowitz, 
1972; Gurr, 1970; Lind and Tyler, 1988). Scholars of social movements, however, began 
to question the effects of grievances on movement participation and proposed that the 
question to be answered is not so much whether people who engage in protest are 
aggrieved, but whether aggrieved people engage in protest. They suggested that effi-
cacy, resources and opportunities would predict protest participation (Klandermans, 
1984; McAdam, 1982; McCarthy and Zald, 1977). Meanwhile, scholars such as Reicher 
(1984), Simon et al. (1998) and Klandermans and de Weerd (2000), began to explore the 
role of collective identity in protest behaviour. Recently, the role of emotions has drawn 
the attention of protest researchers (Van Zomeren et al., 2004). In our work on migrants’ 
protest participation we integrated these elements into a single theoretical framework, 
and we proposed a fifth element to consider – social embeddedness (Klandermans et al., 
2008). Discussions about politics within networks increase efficacy and transform indi-
vidual grievances into shared grievances and group-based anger, which translates into 
protest participation.
Grievances
Grievance theories. Prominent among grievance theories was relative deprivation the-
ory. Feelings of relative deprivation result from comparison of one’s situation with a 
standard – be it one’s past, someone else’s situation, or a cognitive standard such as equity 
or justice (Folger, 1986). If comparison results in the conclusion that one is not receiving 
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what one deserves, one experiences relative deprivation. Runciman (1966) referred to 
relative deprivation based on personal comparisons as egoistic deprivation, and to rela-
tive deprivation based on group comparisons as fraternalistic deprivation. Research sug-
gests that fraternalistic deprivation is particularly important for engagement in protest 
(Dubé and Guimond, 1986; Guimond and Dubé-Simard, 1983; Major, 1994; Martin, 
1986). Foster and Matheson (1999), however, showed that the relation is more complex. 
They demonstrate that when the group’s experience becomes relevant for one’s own 
experience – i.e. when the personal becomes political – motivation to protest increases. 
People who experience both personal deprivation and group deprivation are the most 
strongly motivated to take to the streets. On the basis of a meta-analysis, Van Zomeren et 
al. (2008) conclude that the cognitive component of relative deprivation (as reflected in 
the observation that one receives less than the standard of comparison) has less influence 
on action participation than the affective component (as expressed by such feelings as 
dissatisfaction, indignation and discontent about these outcomes).
Next to relative deprivation, social psychologists have applied social justice theory to 
theorize on grievances and protest (Tyler and Smith, 1998). Social justice literature dis-
tinguishes between two classes of justice judgements: distributive and procedural justice. 
Distributive justice is similar to relative deprivation; it refers to the fairness of outcomes. 
Procedural justice refers to the fairness of decision-making procedures and the relational 
aspects of the social process (being treated with respect, dignity, etc.; Tyler and Smith, 
1998). People care more about how they are treated than about outcomes – do authorities 
treat them with respect, can authorities be trusted to do well by their people? On the basis 
of these findings Tyler and Smith proposed that procedural justice might be a more pow-
erful predictor of social movement participation than distributive justice, although they 
never tested this idea directly (but see Blader, 2007, for a test in the context of labour 
union participation).
Grievances and protest. At the heart of every protest are grievances, be they the experi-
ence of illegitimate inequality, feelings of relative deprivation, feelings of injustice, 
moral indignation about some state of affairs, or a suddenly imposed grievance 
(Klandermans, 1997). Illegitimate inequality is what relative deprivation and social 
justice theories are about. Suddenly imposed grievances refer to an unexpected threat or 
inroad upon people’s rights or circumstances (Walsh, 1981). Grievances resulting from 
violated principles refer to moral outrage because it is felt that important values or 
principles are violated. In more general terms, intergroup conflicts can be framed as 
conflicts about principles or conflicts around material interests (Van Stekelenburg and 
Klandermans, 2009). This distinction is important in the context of protest, because in 
a conflict of interests people are more inclined to take an instrumental route to protest 
to enforce changes, whereas a conflict of principles more likely leads to protests in 
which people express their views and indignation (Van Stekelenburg et al., 2009).
Efficacy
Grievance theories came under attack in the 1970s by scholars arguing that grievances 
do not provide a sufficient reason to participate in protest. Indeed, grievances abound 
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while protest does not. Therefore, they continue, the key question to address is: why do 
some aggrieved people become mobilized, while others do not? Availability of resources 
(McCarthy and Zald, 1977) and the presence of political opportunities (McAdam, 1982) 
were suggested as key to protest mobilization. Groups with more resources and opportu-
nities are more likely to mobilize. The social psychological answer to the question as to 
why some people become mobilized, while others do not is efficacy. Do people expect 
that group-related problems can be solved by united efforts? Do people feel politically 
efficacious, do they trust their politicians, or are they cynical about politics?
Efficacy – theory. Efficacy refers to the individual’s expectation that it is possible to alter 
conditions or policies through protest (Gamson, 1992). This echoes certain properties of 
the classic sociological construct of agency, which similarly refers to beliefs that indi-
vidual actions have the potential to shape, and thus change, the social structure. For the 
perception of the possibility of change to take hold people need to perceive the group to 
be able to unite and fight for the issue and they must perceive the political context as 
receptive to the claims made by their group. The first refers to group efficacy: the belief 
that group-related problems can be solved by collective efforts (Bandura, 1997), and the 
second refers to political efficacy: the feeling that political actions can have an impact on 
the political process (Campbell et al., 1954). Political efficacy is conceptualized as hav-
ing two dimensions: internal efficacy – the extent to which someone believes to under-
stand politics and therefore participates in politics; and external efficacy – citizens’ faith 
and trust in government. Related to political efficacy is political cynicism – defined as 
the opposite of political efficacy and inversely related to trust in government (e.g. 
Cappella and Jamieson, 1997).
Efficacy and protest. Several studies have shown that feelings of efficacy are highly cor-
related with participation in protest and also meta-analytically this relation proved to be 
important (Van Zomeren et al., 2008). Mummendey et al. (1999) propose that group – 
rather than personal – efficacy predicts protest participation. Furthermore, Klandermans 
(1984, 1997) shows that people are more likely to participate in movement activities 
when they believe this will help to redress their grievances at affordable costs. The rela-
tionship is straightforward: the more effective an individual believes protest participation 
is, the more likely she or he is to participate. Efficacious and inefficacious people take 
different routes to social change though: while normative forms of protest like petitioning 
and demonstrations tend to attract highly efficacious people, non-normative forms of 
protest are more likely to attract low efficacious people (Tausch et al., 2008). Cynicism, 
finally, works to both reduce and reinforce action participation depending on whether it 
goes together with perceived unfairness (Klandermans et al., 2008). The least active are 
those who combine political cynicism with the feeling that they are treated fairly; the 
most active are those who combine cynicism with the feeling that they are treated unfairly.
Identity
In the 1980s it became clear that instrumental reasoning is not a sufficient reason to par-
ticipate in protest. Increasingly, the significance of collective identity as a factor stimulating 
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participation in protest was emphasized. Several empirical studies report consistently 
that the more people identify with a group the more they are inclined to protest on behalf 
of that group (de Weerd and Klandermans, 1999; Kelly and Breinlinger, 1995; 
Klandermans et al., 2002; Mummendey et al., 1999; Reicher, 1984; Simon and 
Klandermans, 2001; Simon et al., 1998; Stryker et al., 2000). Also meta-analytically this 
relation is confirmed (Van Zomeren et al., 2008).
Identity is our understanding of who we are and who other people are, and, recipro-
cally, other people’s understanding of themselves and others (Jenkins, 2004). Simon et 
al. (1998) succinctly describe identity as a place in society. A place is a metaphorical 
expression and stands for any position on any socially relevant dimension such as nation-
ality, ethnicity, gender, age and so forth. A person has a personal and several social iden-
tities. Personal identity refers to self-definition in terms of personal attributes, whereas 
social identity refers to self-definition in terms of social category memberships (Tajfel 
and Turner, 1979). If a social identity becomes more salient than personal identity, peo-
ple are inclined to define their personal self in terms of what makes them different from 
others, whereas they tend to define their social identities in terms of what makes them 
similar to others. The redefinition from an ‘I’ into a ‘we’ as a locus of self-definition 
makes people think, feel and act as members of their group and transforms individual 
into collective behaviour (Turner, 1999)
Social identity theory. In the 1970s, a social psychological identity perspective on protest 
emerged in the form of social identity theory (SIT; Tajfel and Turner 1979). Tajfel and 
Turner (1979) showed that social categorization according to some trivial criterion such 
as the ‘blue’ or the ‘red’ group suffices to make people feel, think and act as a group 
member. Compared to this ‘minimal group paradigm’, real world intergroup conflicts 
with histories, high emotional intensity attached to them and sociopolitical consequences 
can be seen as ‘maximal group paradigms’ that bring group membership powerfully to 
mind (Van Stekelenburg et al., 2010). SIT proposes that people generally strive for and 
benefit from positive social identities associated with their groups. The only way for 
participants in minimal group studies to obtain a positive social identity is by identifying 
with the groups into which they are categorized, and then ensuring that their group comes 
off best in the only available comparison between the groups (i.e. giving more rewards 
to the in-group than the out-group). Why, then, would people identify with groups that 
reflect negatively on them (e.g. disadvantaged or low-status groups)? SIT’s answer is 
that three social structural characteristics affect how people manage their identity con-
cerns. The first social structural characteristic is permeability of the group boundaries, 
the possibilities perceived by the individual to attain membership of a higher status 
group. Permeable group boundaries allow disadvantaged group members to leave their 
group for a higher status group, whereas impermeable boundaries offer no such ‘exit’ (cf. 
Hirschman, 1970). When people do not perceive possibilities to join a higher status 
group, they might feel commitment to the lower status group. The second social struc-
tural characteristic is stability, the extent to which status positions are stable or varia-
ble. People who conceive status positions as variable see protest as a possible method 
to heighten group status, especially when the low group status is perceived as illegiti-
mate. Members of a low-status group who perceive the dominant group’s position as 
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illegitimate and unstable can use a variety of strategies to obtain a more positive social 
identity. They may, for instance, redefine characteristics of their own group previously 
seen as negative (Black is beautiful!); or they may engage in social competition of which 
protest is the clearest expression.
Protest of powerful vs powerless. Groups in conflict often differ in power and status, and 
changing status relations and their perceived legitimacy are crucial in understanding 
intergroup conflict. Traditionally, SIT studies have focused on low-status groups collec-
tively challenging the actions of high-status groups. However, members of high-status 
groups may also challenge the authority in solidarity with members of low-status groups 
(Subasiç et al., 2008). At the core of this political solidarity is psychological change in 
the self-categorization of members of high-status groups through which it is no longer 
the authority but the minority that best embodies the relevant norms, values and beliefs 
that define who ‘we’ are and how ‘we’ should relate to each other. Through this process, 
high-status members embrace low-status members’ cause as their own and become will-
ing to collectively challenge the authority. Moreover, members of high-status groups 
may perceive their own identity to be threatened too if they believe that their status is 
eroding or that low-status groups are becoming more powerful (Van Stekelenburg et al., 
2010). For instance, whenever an ethnic threat arises – due to substantial immigration 
flows or economic contraction – majority groups react with exclusionary measures 
(Olzak and Koopmans, 2004). Interestingly, it is perceptions of competition rather than 
actual competition that evoke hostility to minorities (Sniderman et al., 2004).
Dual and multiple identities. Recent work on multiple identities (cf. Kurtz, 2002) empha-
sizes that people can hold many different identities at the same time, which may push in 
the same direction or may come into conflict. When two of the groups people identify 
with end up on opposite sides of a controversy (for example, union members who are 
faced with the decision to strike against their company), people might find themselves 
under cross-pressure (Oegema and Klandermans, 1994). Indeed, workers who go on 
strike or movement activists who challenge their government are often accused of being 
disloyal to the company or the country. González and Brown (2003) coined the term 
‘dual identity’ to point to the concurrent workings of identities. These authors argue that 
identification with a subordinate entity (e.g. ethnic identity) does not necessarily exclude 
identification with a supraordinate entity (e.g. national identity). In fact, they hold that a 
‘dual identity’ is the desirable configuration as it implies sufficient identification with 
one’s own group to experience some basic security and sufficient identification with the 
overarching identity to preclude divisiveness (see also Huo et al., 1996). There is evi-
dence that immigrants who display a dual identity are more inclined to take onto the 
streets on behalf of their group (Simon and Ruhs, 2008). This is further specified by 
Klandermans et al. (2008), who report that immigrants who display a dual identification 
tend to be more satisfied with their situation than those who do not display such identity, 
but if they are dissatisfied they will be more likely to participate in protest.
Identification and protest. Why is group identification such a powerful motivational push 
to protest? First of all, identification with others is accompanied by an awareness of 
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similarity and shared fate with those who belong to the same category. Furthermore, the 
‘strength’ of an identity comes from its affective component (see Ellemers, 1993, for a 
similar argument); the more ‘the group is in me’ the more ‘I feel for us’ (Yzerbyt et al., 
2003) and the stronger I am motivated to participate on behalf of the group. Collective 
identification, especially the more politicized form of it, intensifies feelings of efficacy 
(see Simon et al., 1998; Van Zomeren et al., 2008). Next to shared fate, shared emotions 
and enhanced efficaciousness, identification with others involved generates a felt inner 
obligation to behave as a ‘good’ group member (Stürmer and Simon, 2003). When self-
definition changes from personal to social identity, the group norm of participation 
becomes salient; the more one identifies with the group, the more weight this group norm 
will carry and the more it will result in an ‘inner obligation’ to participate on behalf of 
the group. Together these dynamics explain why group identification functions as a 
‘stepping stone’ to a politicized identity.
Politicized identity. Collective identities must politicize to become the engine of collective 
action. Typically, politicization of identities begins with the awareness of shared griev-
ances. Next, an external enemy is blamed for the group’s predicament, and claims for 
compensation are levelled against this enemy. Unless appropriate compensation is 
granted, the power struggle continues. Politicization of identities and the underlying 
power struggle unfold as a sequence of politicizing events that gradually transforms the 
group’s relationship to its social environment, whereby the tactical choices are again 
shaped by identity (Polletta, 2009). Hence, workers strike and anarchists fight the police. 
If in the course of this struggle the group seeks to win the support of third parties such as 
more powerful authorities (e.g. the national government) or the general public, identities 
fully politicize (Simon and Klandermans, 2001). Langner (in prep.) developed a measure 
of politicized collective identity (PCI) to assess individual differences in the political 
meaning of an identity. The more politicized group members are the more likely they will 
engage in collective action directed at the government or the general public. This is meta-
analytically also demonstrated (Van Zomeren et al., 2008).
Emotions
The study of emotions has become a popular research area in the social psychology of 
protest. Such was not always the case. As rational approaches were the state-of-the-art, 
emotions were often regarded as some peripheral ‘error term’ in motivational theories. 
Group-based appraisal theories of emotions have reintroduced emotions to the social 
psychology of protest. Emotions function as accelerators or amplifiers (Van Stekelenburg 
and Klandermans, 2007). Accelerators make something move faster, and amplifiers 
make something sound louder. In the world of protest accelerating means that due to 
emotions motives to join a social movement translate into action faster, while amplifying 
means that these motives are stronger.
Appraisal theory of emotions. People are continuously evaluating or appraising the rele-
vance of their environment for their well-being. After a quick and automatic evaluation 
of an event’s implications for one’s well-being and of one’s ability to cope with the 
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situation, other appraisal dimensions are evaluated: How does the event influence my 
goals? Who or what caused the event? Do I have control and power over the conse-
quences of the event? Are the consequences of the event compatible with my personal 
values and (societal) norms (Lazarus, 1966)? As a consequence, two persons can appraise 
the same event differently and have different emotional responses (for an overview of 
different appraisals, see Roseman et al., 1996).
Appraisal theory was developed to explain personal emotions experienced by indi-
viduals. Yet, ‘the self’ implicated in emotion-relevant appraisals is clearly not only a 
personal or individual self. If group membership becomes part of the self, events that 
harm or favour an in-group by definition harm or favour the self, and the self might 
thus experience emotions on behalf of the in-group. With such considerations in mind, 
Smith (1993) developed a model of intergroup emotions that were predicated on 
social identification with the group. The main postulate of intergroup emotion theory 
is that when a social identity is salient, situations are appraised in terms of their con-
sequences for the in-group, eliciting specific intergroup emotions and behavioural 
intentions. Thus people experience emotions on behalf of their group when the social 
category is salient and they identify with the group at stake (Devos et al., 2002; 
Gordijn et al., 2006).
Group-based emotions and protest. Anger is seen as the prototypical protest emotion (Van 
Stekelenburg and Klandermans, 2007). For those of us who have been part of protest 
events or watched reports on protest events in the news media, this is hardly surprising. 
Indeed, it is hard to conceive of protest detached from anger. Van Zomeren et al. (2004) 
show that group-based anger is an important motivator of protest participation of disad-
vantaged groups. Leach and colleagues examined readiness for political action among 
advantaged Australians to oppose government plans to redress disadvantaged Aborigi-
nes. They found that symbolic racism and relative deprivation evoked group-based anger 
which in turn promoted willingness for political action (Leach et al., 2007). But advan-
taged group members can also perceive the in-group advantage as unfair and feel guilt 
and anger about it. Anger related to in-group advantage, and to a lesser degree guilt, 
appears to be a potent predictor for protest (Leach et al., 2006).
There exists a relation to efficacy. People who perceive the in-group as strong are 
more likely to experience anger and desire to take action; people who perceive the 
in-group as weak are more likely to feel fearful and to move away from the out-
group (Devos et al., 2002; Klandermans et al., 2008). Anger moves people to adopt 
a more challenging relationship with authorities than subordinate emotions such as 
shame and despair (Taylor, 2009) or fear (Klandermans et al., 2008). In explaining 
different tactics, efficacy appears to be relevant too. Group-based anger is mainly 
observed in normative actions where efficacious people protest. However, in non-
normative violent actions contempt appears to be the more relevant emotion (Fischer 
and Roseman, 2007; Tausch et al., 2008). This suggests two emotional routes to 
protest: an anger route based on efficacy leading to normative action and a contempt 
route when legitimate channels are closed (Wright et al., 1990) and the situation is 
seen as hopeless invoking a ‘nothing to lose’ strategy leading to non-normative pro-
test (Kamans et al., 2011).
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Social embeddedness
The decision to take part in protest is not taken in social isolation. On the contrary, indi-
vidual grievances and feelings are transformed into group-based grievances and feelings 
within social networks. As early as 1965, Almond and Verba observed a positive correla-
tion between active engagement in voluntary associations and political efficacy. They 
argued that by engaging in voluntary associations people learn about the working of 
political institutions. This became known as social capital (Putnam, 1993), defined by 
Lin (1999: 35) as ‘resources embedded in a social structure which are accessed and/or 
mobilized in purposive actions’.
Social embeddedness and theory. The concept of social capital has important implications 
for advancing our understanding of the role of social embeddedness in protest participa-
tion. Exploring the impact of social capital takes into account the social context in which 
the decision to participate or not is produced. As a set of relationships, social capital has 
many different attributes, which are categorized into three components: a structural, a 
relational and a cognitive component (Nahapiet and Ghoshal, 1998). The structural com-
ponent of social capital refers to the presence or absence of network ties between actors 
and it essentially defines who people can reach. Structural social capital encourages 
cooperative behaviour, thereby facilitating mobilization and participation (Baldassarri 
and Diani, 2007; Putnam, 1993). The relational component of social capital concerns the 
kinds of personal relationships people have developed through a history of interaction 
(Granovetter, 1973). It focuses on the particular relationships people have, such as 
respect, trust and friendship. The structural position may be necessary, but it does not 
appear sufficient to help individuals overcome the collective action dilemma. Relational 
capital implies what people are actually able to receive in terms of informational, physi-
cal and emotional support. When trust is built between people they are more willing to 
engage in cooperative activity through which further trust can be generated (on trust, see 
Lind and Tyler 1988; on respect, Stürmer and Simon, 2003). The third – cognitive 
component – is defined as those resources providing shared representations, interpreta-
tions and systems of meaning. It constitutes a powerful form of social capital in the 
context of protest. The cognitive dimension is in protest literature referred to as raised 
consciousness – a set of political beliefs and action orientations arising out of an aware-
ness of similarity (Gurin et al., 1980: 30). Consciousness raising takes place within social 
networks. It is within these networks that individual processes as grievance formation, 
strengthening of efficacy, identification and group-based emotions all synthesize into a 
motivational constellation preparing people for action. Both resource mobilization the-
ory and political process theory emphasize the structural component, the role of social 
networks, especially as mobilizing structures (Diani and McAdam, 2003; Kitts, 2000; 
McAdam et al., 1996). Sociological and social psychological approaches put more 
emphasis on the relational and cognitive component.
Social embeddedness and protest. Social embeddedness plays a pivotal role in the context 
of protest, but why? The effect of interaction in networks on the propensity to participate 
in politics is contingent on the amount of political discussion that occurs in social 
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networks and the information that people are able to gather about politics as a result 
(McClurg, 2003). Klandermans et al. (2008) provide evidence for such mechanisms: 
immigrants who felt efficacious were more likely to participate in protest provided that 
they were embedded in social networks, especially ethnic networks, which offer an 
opportunity to discuss and learn about politics. Networks provide space for the creation 
and dissemination of discourse critical of authorities, and provide a way for active oppo-
sition to these authorities to grow (Paxton, 2002). In other words, this is where people 
talk politics and thus where the factuality of the sociopolitical world is constructed and 
people are mobilized for protest. Being integrated in a network increases the chances that 
one will be targeted with a mobilizing message and that people are kept to their promises 
to participate (Klandermans and Oegema, 1987). For example, people with friends or 
acquaintances that are already active within social movements are more likely to take 
part in movement actions than others (Gould, 1993; Klandermans, 1997). Social net-
works function as communication channels, discursive processes take place to form con-
sensus that makes up the symbolic resources in collective sense-making (Gamson, 1992; 
Klandermans, 1988), people are informed of upcoming events and social capital as trust 
and loyalty accumulate in networks to provide individuals with the resources needed to 
invest in protest (Klandermans et al., 2008).
Mobilization
When an individual participates in protest this is the result of a sometimes lengthy pro-
cess of mobilization. Mobilization is a complicated process that can be broken down into 
several, conceptually distinct steps. Klandermans (1984) proposed to break the process 
of mobilization down into consensus and action mobilization.
Consensus mobilization. Participating because of common interests or ideologies requires 
a shared interpretation of who should act, why and how. Movements affect such interpre-
tations by the information they disseminate, a process known as framing (see Benford 
and Snow, 2000; Snow and Benford, 1988, 1992). Gerhards and Rucht’s (1992) study of 
flyers produced by the various groups and organizations involved in the protests against 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank in Berlin is an excellent 
example in this respect. These authors show how links are constructed between the ideo-
logical frame of the organizers of the demonstration and those of the participating organ-
izations in order to create a shared definition of the situation.
Action mobilization. Action mobilization is further broken down into four separate steps: 
people need to sympathize with the cause, need to know about the upcoming event, must 
want to participate and they must be able to participate (see Figure 1; Klandermans and 
Oegema, 1987).
The first step accounts for the results of consensus mobilization. It distinguishes the 
general public into those who sympathize with the cause and those who do not. The more 
successful consensus mobilization has been, the larger the pool of sympathizers a mobi-
lizing movement organization can draw from. The second step is equally obvious as 
crucial: it divides the sympathizers into those who have been target of mobilization 
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attempts and those who have not. The third step divides the sympathizers who have been 
targeted into those who are motivated to participate in the specific activity and those who 
are not. Finally, the fourth step differentiates the people who are motivated into those 
who end up participating and those who do not. The net result of these different steps is 
that some (usually small) proportion of the general public participates in protest. With 
each step smaller or larger numbers drop out until an individual eventually takes the final 
step to participate in an instance of collective political action.
Where do we stand: Assessment of research to date
In providing answers to the questions as to why people protest, we separately discussed 
grievances, efficacy, identity, emotions and social embeddedness, but obviously in prac-
tice all these concepts are interwoven. And this is precisely what social psychological 
protest research to date focuses on. Simon et al. (1998) proposed a dual path model to 
protest participation in which they distinguished between an instrumental pathway, 
guided by calculative reasoning that concentrates on the costs and benefits of participa-
tion, and an identity pathway, guided by processes of identification. In several studies 
Simon and his collaborators find empirical support for their concept of a dual pathway to 
protest participation. Be it in their studies of identification with the Fat Acceptance 
Movement (Stürmer and Simon, 2003), the older people’s movement or the gay move-
ment (Simon et al., 1998), both instrumentality and identification made unique contribu-
tions to the prediction of willingness to participate. Rather than replacing instrumentality 
as an explanatory paradigm, identification is added to the explanation as a second path-
way. Van Zomeren et al. (2004) also propose a dual path model, comprising an efficacy 
and emotion path. The importance of emotions as motivators is shown, again without 
replacing the instrumental pathway. In our own work we combined grievances, efficacy, 
identity and emotions. The model we developed and began to test assigns a central, inte-
grating role to processes of identification (Van Stekelenburg et al., 2009). In order to 
develop the shared grievances and shared emotions a shared identity is needed (Figure 2). 
Sympathizer
Not a
sympathizer
Not
targeted
Targeted
Not
motivated
Motivated
Not a
participant
Participant
Figure 1. The process of action mobilization.
See Klandermans and Oegema (1987).
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Motivational
Strength
Ideology
Efficacy
Group-based
Anger
Identity
Figure 2. Motivational framework integrating identities, grievances and emotions.
See Van Stekelenburg and Klandermans (2007, 2010); Van Stekelenburg et al. (2011).
According to this model grievances originate from interests and/or principles that are felt 
to be threatened. The more people feel that interests of the group and/or principles that 
the group values are threatened, the angrier they are and the more they are prepared to 
take part in protest to protect their interests and principles and/or to express their anger.
Future directions: Challenges for the social psychology 
of protest
What are the challenges a social psychology of protest faces? Probably, the most signifi-
cant challenge is the paradox of persistent participation (Louis, 2009). Activism fre-
quently persists despite pessimism regarding the action’s ostensible goals (Louis, 2009; 
Oegema and Klandermans, 1994). Why do people continue participating in protest 
although it does not effectuate their claims? Drury and Reicher (2009) suggest that par-
ticipation generates a ‘positive social-psychological transformation’. They argue that 
participation in protest strengthens identification and induces collective empowerment. 
The emergence of an inclusive self-categorization as ‘oppositional’ leads to feelings of 
unity and expectations of support. This empowers people to offend authorities. Such 
action, they continue, creates collective self-objectification, that is, defines the partici-
pant’s oppositional identity vis-a-vis the dominant out-group. More generally, the theme 
of sustained participation raises another underexplored issue, namely the personal con-
sequences of movement participation. The individual consequences of participation in 
collective action are a relatively untouched area which scholars have just recently begun 
to investigate (for instance on empowerment, see Drury and Reicher, 1999, 2000, 2009; 
Drury et al., 2005; on empowerment and politicization and on individual trajectories of 
participation, see Corrigall-Brown, 2012; and for a more general overview making a plea 
for the investigation of individual consequences of protest, see Louis, 2009).
This brings us to probably the most important challenge of the social psychology of 
protest, namely to move from static decontextualized explanations of protest to more 
dynamic, contextualized models of protest. In 2007 (Van Stekelenburg and Klandermans) 
we made a plea for more dynamic models. We argued that a more dynamic approach 
would provide the opportunity to study mechanisms through concepts like identification, 
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participation motives, efficacy, emotions and feelings of injustice as consequence and 
antecedent of collective action. This is not easy, as Ellemers observes: ‘From an investi-
gational point of view, it is difficult to deal with a variable that, at the same time, can be 
a dependent and an independent variable, can develop over time or change across con-
texts‘ (Ellemers et al., 1999: 3). Yet, studying protest participation in a more dynamic 
way would do more justice to the theoretical and empirical richness of the concepts and 
may be crucial to gain better insights into the processes at hand (cf. McAdam et al., 
2001). An example of such a dynamic model next to those we discussed in the previous 
pages is Van Zomeren et al.’s dynamic dual pathway model of protest (Van Zomeren, 
2012; Van Zomeren et al., 2012). These authors introduce a dynamic model that inte-
grates many common explanations of collective action (i.e. group identity, unfairness, 
anger, social support and efficacy). The model conceptualizes collective action as the 
outcome of two distinct processes: emotion-focused and problem-focused coping. The 
former revolves around the experience of group-based anger, while the latter revolves 
around beliefs in the group’s efficacy. The model makes explicit the dynamic nature of 
collective action by explaining how undertaking collective action leads to the reap-
praisal of collective disadvantage, thus inspiring future collective action. Tausch and 
colleagues are among the first to report empirical findings on how emotions affect the 
dynamic nature of collective action participation. They show that protest participants 
experience more out-group-directed anger and contempt, and self-directed positive 
affect. Out-group anger and contempt rather than self-directed positive affect inspire 
future collective action (Becker et al., 2011). In yet another study – a two-wave longitu-
dinal field study – they examine how emotional responses to success and failure of col-
lective action inspire future collective action (Tausch and Becker, in press). They found 
that both pride (in relation to success) and anger (in response to failure) motivated future 
collective action. While anger stemming from failure predicted future protest directly, 
pride resulting from success enhanced feelings of efficacy which inspired future actions. 
These few examples are an excellent start for the years to come, taking the dynamic 
nature of collective action seriously will shed light on the many unanswered questions 
related to sustained participation and disengagement – and indeed on the question of 
protest, and then what (Louis, 2009)?
Next to antecedents and consequences of protest, our plea for dynamic models also 
alludes to the thorny issue of causality. Indeed, the majority of the findings and relations 
we reported is based on correlational data. Correlational data can be interpreted in causal 
terms based on the theories we have, but cannot demonstrate causality. Take for instance 
the relation between efficacy, embeddedness and protest. Based on social capital theo-
ries, we interpreted our correlational data in causal terms, that is, the more embedded 
people are, the more efficacious they feel and the more they protest. However, are more 
efficacious people more inclined to become members of organizations or do people 
become more efficacious in their networks? We simply do not know. Social psycholo-
gists attempt to overcome the problem of causality by employing experimental methods. 
These experiments have a high internal validity, and have the potential to make strong 
causal statements. However, laboratory experiments are often detached from natural set-
tings resulting in low ecological validity. Indeed, are students in the lab who report high 
intentions to protest, really willing to take to the streets? We cannot be sure about it. First 
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of all, because the correlation between intentions and actual participation is moderate at 
best (Oegema and Klandermans 1994), but perhaps more importantly, because we sim-
ply do not know whether artificially created grievances, identification and efficacy are 
comparable to real life indignation stemming from imperilled interests or violated prin-
ciples. In a longitudinal field study in a natural setting we seek to address this issue of 
causality (Van Stekelenburg et al., 2012). Longitudinal data are collected in a newly built 
Dutch neighbourhood. Within approximately a month of their arrival inhabitants receive 
a questionnaire pursued by four follow-up surveys, which encompasses predictors of 
protest, several protest intentions and actual participation and network questions. Thus, 
we monitor the development of demand and supply of protest as it starts from scratch. 
This means moving beyond correlation studies and studies of isolated individuals in 
surveys or laboratories. In that way, we hope to be able to shed more light on causality 
issues in protest participation.
A final theme that begs for more social psychological research is the impact of the 
sociopolitical context affecting people’s routes to protest. If people are very angry and 
decide to not take it anymore, the decision to protest is not taken in a social vacuum. 
Collective struggles rooted in a social or political context are, by definition, fought out 
in this context. Koopmans and Statham (2000) and Roggeband (2004), for example, 
showed that the dynamics of participation are created and limited by characteristics of 
the national contexts in which people are embedded. So far, social psychological research 
has hardly focused on the subjective experience of these macro-level factors. To be sure, 
three decades ago social identity theory (SIT) proposed social structural characteristics 
as the permeability of the group boundaries, stability and illegitimacy affecting people’s 
inclination to protest. These rather abstract structural characteristics were good to manip-
ulate in the laboratories, but what do they tell us about how real life economic, social and 
political processes affect the routes that individual participants take towards protest? 
How do political opportunities or restraints, or the strength or weakness of multiorgani-
zational fields, or organizational frames, or the proposed tactic affect the routes that 
individual participants take towards participation? Future social psychological research 
should try to identify variables at the meso or macro level that are important in affecting 
people’s subjective interpretations of their collective disadvantages.
Annotated further reading
First, we would like to suggest three books and one special issue on social movements and their 
collective actions in general:
Klandermans B and Roggeband CM (eds) (2007) The Handbook of Social Movements across 
Disciplines (2007). New York: Springer. Read this book because it provides an interesting 
overview of how different disciplines (sociology, political science, social geography, anthro-
pology and social psychology) approach social movements.
Klandermans B (1997) The Social Psychology of Protest. Oxford: Blackwell. This book provides 
an overview of the first two decades of the social psychology of protest.
Journal of Social Issues, December 2009. A special issue on the Social and Psychological 
Dynamics of Collective Action. Guest editors: A Iyar and M van Zomeren.
Snow DA, Soule SA and Kriesi H (eds) (2004) The Blackwell Companion to Social Movements. 
Oxford: Blackwell. A recent collection of different topics related to social movements.
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On emotions in the context of protest we suggest the following book because it introduces and 
conceptualizes group-based emotions:
Mackie DM and Smith ER (eds) (2002) From Prejudice to Intergroup Emotions: Differentiated 
Reactions to Social Groups. New York: Psychology Press.
On identity we suggest to read:
Stryker S, Owens TJ and White RW (eds) (2000) Self, Identity, and Social Movements. Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press. An interesting interdisciplinary overview on identity in the 
context of social movements.
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Résumé
Recherche dans la psychologie sociale nous a révélé beaucoup des motifs de 
protestation. Cet article résume ce travail théorique et empirique et traite les griefs, 
l’efficacité, l’identification, les émotions et l’intégration dans des réseaux sociaux. Aussi 
les approches plus récents sont présentés, qui combinent ces concepts dans des modèles 
double traces. Finalement, on discute deux développements futures: (1) le paradoxe de 
la participation persistante et (2) l’influence des perceptions du contexte sociopolitique 
sur la participation protestataire.
Mots-clés
Action collective, émotions, identité, psychologie sociale de protestation, réclamations
Resumen
La investigación social psicológica ha revelado muchos detalles acerca de las motivaciones 
de protestas. Este artículo ofrece una visión general teorética y empírica, discutiendo 
los motivos, la eficacia, la identificación, las emociones y la radicación social, seguidas 
por las aproximaciones más recientes que combinan estos conceptos en modelos de 
senderos duales. Finalmente, se discuten dos objetivos futuros: (1) arrojar luz sobre la 
paradoja de la participación persistente, y (2) aclarar cómo las percepciones de contexto 
socio-político afectan la participación en protestas.
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Acción colectiva, emociones, identidad, psicología social de protesta, quejas
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